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Notes

INJUNCTION TO PREVENT DIVULGENCE OF
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY WIRETAPS IN
STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Officers of the State of New York, in compliance with the Constitution' and statutes2 of that state, but in direct violation of a
federal statute,3 tapped a telephone belonging to a person suspected
of certain felonies, intending to use the evidence obtained thereby
against the suspect in a prospective state criminal prosecution.
After having been indicted by a State Grand Jury, the accused
began an action in Federal District Court for an injunction to enjoin
a State District Attorney, a municipal Police Commissioner, and
others, from divulging the existence or contents of the conversations overheard, as well as the introduction of all evidence resulting
from such wiretaps, in the accused's trial. That court denied the
injunction.4 Pending an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the accused
moved for a stay so as to halt proceedings in the state courts and
preserve the status quo between the parties until final adjudication
of his appeal. This relief was granted, but upon consideration of

1 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12 provides:

"The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable inter-

ception of telephone . . . communications shall not be violated, and ex

2

parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that
there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be
thus obtained .... "
N.Y. CODE OF CR. PROC. § 813(a) provides:
"An ex parte order for the interception, overhearing or recording
of . . . telephonic communications may be issued . . . upon oath or affirmation . . . that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence
of crime may be thus obtained . .. ."

3

The Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1958) provides:
"... [N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, or contents . . . or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person

4

Pugach v. Sullivan, 180 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. N.Y. 1960). Cf. Bolger v.
United States, 189 F. Supp. 237 (S.D. N.Y. 1960), which is probably

distinguishable on the basis that the requested injunction was directed
at federal officers who had violated federal rules and procedures.

5 Pugach v. Dollinger, 275 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1960) (Madden, J., dissenting),
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the appeal by the full court sitting en banc, the decision of the
District Court was affirmed. 6 The stay previously granted was
continued, however, pending application by the accused to the
United States Supreme Court for certiorari. 7 The denial of the injunction has been just recently affirmed in a per curiam decision.8
The judgment of the Court of Appeals 9 is in accordance with
the principles of law ordinarily thought to be applicable in like
cases. These principles have been enunciated by the Supreme Court
in a series of rather well-known cases which may be classified, for
the purposes of this note, into two analagous fact situations-the
illegal search and seizure cases and the wiretap cases.
In essence, that Court has held inadmissible in federal prosecutions such evidence as has been obtained by either an illegal
search and seizure' ° or an illegal wiretap," regardless of whether
federal1 2 or state 13 officers secured the evidence. The Court has
also held that it makes no difference whether the calls intercepted
were interstate or intrastate in character, 14 and has extended the
prohibition to exclude not only the communications themselves,
but all information and evidence gained as the result of a wiretap. 15
Where the evidence is to be used in state prosecutions, and
was obtained by state officers, the Court has held, however, that
its admittance may not be enjoined by federal courts in the illegal
wiretap situation, 16 nor will it be sufficient grounds for reversing

6 Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960) (Clark, J., dissenting).
7 Pugach v. Dollinger, 280 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 363 U.S.
836 (1960), aff'd per curiam, 81 Sup. Ct. 650 (1961).
8 Pugach v. Dollinger, 81 Sup. Ct. 650 (1961).
9 Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960) (Clark, J., dissenting).
10 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
11 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 397 (1937). This case, however, was

decided after passage of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §
605 (1934).

In Olmsted v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), it had

been held, four Justices dissenting, that the Fourth and Fifth Amend-

ments would not be violated by the admission in a federal prosecution
of evidence obtained by federal officers in a wiretap. This case has
never been overruled, and remains the law. See Annots., 53 A.L.R. 1472
(1928) and 66 A.L.R. 376 (1930).
12

Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 397 (1937).

13 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).

v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 '(1939);
15 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
I6 Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951). The Court said that to hold
otherwise would be to adversely affect the proper balance between the
'i4Weiss

NOTES

a conviction in the illegal search and seizure situation. 17 In cases
of illegal wiretapping the Court has indicated that use of the evidence is largely a matter of state discretion.'8 The only major
exception to the foregoing rules arises where coercive physical
violence is used in conducting an illegal search and seizure. Here,
if the Court's conscience is sufficiently "shocked," it will upset
a conviction obtained through use of of illegally secured evidence. 19
This exception to the rule is, however, quite narrow, and the Court
has ruled in effect that its conscience is not sufficiently "shocked"
regardless of how serious the
where there is no coercive violence,
20
invasion of privacy might be.

From the foregoing discussion of the basic principles of law
applicable to the illegal search and seizure and wiretap cases, it
would seem likely that the Supreme Court, under the doctrine of
stare decisis, would deem itself bound to affirm the Court of
Appeals in its refusal to grant injunctive relief to the petitioner.
It is submitted, however, that this case presented the Court
a situation somewhat different from any it had yet considered.
21
Here there had been a consistent pattern of federal law violation,
not just an isolated instance as was the case in Stefanelli v.
Minard.22 Further, the Court was here asked to prevent a federal law
violation before it had occurred, since under the federal statute involved divulgance itself is expressly prohibited. In the present
case there has not yet been a divulgance injurious to the accused.

state and federal courts. See also Voci v. Storb, 235 F.2d 48 (3rd Cir.
1956) and Pugach v. Sullivan, 180 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
17 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
(four Justices dissenting).
Here the Court ruled that
18Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).

Congress did not intend the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §
605 (1934), to impose the federal exclusionary rule of evidence on state
courts, and said that the states were free to make and apply their own
rules of evidence to the subject matter.
19 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), where state officers
forcibly caused a suspect's stomach to be pumped in recovering evidence
he had been able to swallow despite their violent attempts to refrain

him from doing so.
20 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). Here a clandestine microphone
was placed in the bedroom of a married suspect for a period of twenty
days, all that transpired therein during that period being overheard by
state officers.
21

Brown, The Great Wiretapping Debate and the Crisis in Law Enforce-

ment, 6 N.Y.L.F. 265 (1960), where it is stated that in 1952, for instance,
there were 480 orders issued for wiretaps in New York City alone.
22Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951). See also Judge Clark's dissent in Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960).
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This element distinguishes the present case from all previous
cases since all have, without exception, presented situations where
the violations had already taken place.2 3 In addition the present
case is different from all other cases except Stefanelli, which
has been distinguished above,24 in that in every other instance the
petitioner had been convicted before appealing to the Supreme
Court. Such is not the case here. The petitioner in the present
case had yet to be tried. It might also be observed that this case
comes directly within the language of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
majority opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 25 where he wrote: ". . . we
have no hesitation in saying that were a state affirmatively to
sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter
to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 26 Here it is
abundantly clear that the State of New York has indeed affirmatively sanctioned "such police incursion into privacy." On that
basis, Justice Frankfurter's language, in conjunction with the distinctions outlined above, would seem to present a strong case in
favor of the accused.
In addition to the possibilities already mentioned, the present
case presents yet another. If the accused is convicted through the
use of the illegally obtained evidence the law is clear that his
conviction will not be subject to reversal on appeal under either
state 27 or federal 2s law.
Failure, therefore, to grant the requested injunction will actually work an irreparable injury upon him if he is subsequently
convicted, while it is true that he may have a civil cause of action

23

Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).

The same was true in Wolf v.

Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (four Justices dissenting), and Stefanelli v.
Minard, 342 U.S. 177 (1951). In the latter the only illegal act was the
search itself, and although the Court was asked to grant an injunction

to prevent the admission of the evidence, such as is the case here, it
could not prevent the illegal act itself, as that act consisted solely of the
search, and had already taken place. In that case divulgance was not an
illegal act in and of itself. Here wiretapping and divulgance are, under

the federal statute, two separate and distinct acts which are equally
prohibited, and although the wiretap itself has already taken place, in-

jurious divulgance has not, and may be prevented by injunctive relief.

In the present case divulgance in and of itself is an illegal act.
See note 23, supra.
25 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (four Justices dissenting).
2
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24

27

People v. Variano, 5 N.Y.2d 391, 157 N.E.2d 857, 185 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1959)

and People v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 500, 158 N.E.2d 817, 186 N.Y.S.2d 230
(1959).

28

Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
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for damages.2 9 This can hardly be deemed adequate, and there
is no doubt as to the state's intention to use the evidence, if such
use is not enjoined,3 0 despite criminal sanctions possible under the
federal statute which would be violated. 31 Thus the Court might
also base an opinion favorable to the petitioner upon language found
in a case involving alleged encroachments by a state upon the
freedoms of speech, press and religion.3 2 It was said there that
the federal Supremacy Clause should be used as a basis for the
intervention by federal courts in state prosecutions in ".

.

. ex-

ceptional cases which call for the interposition of a court of equity
to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and imminent. .. "
The Pugach case would seem to have presented just such a situation, but the United States Supreme Court held otherwise, 33 stating
only that the decision was being based on Schwartz v. Texas, 34 and
Stefanelli v. Minard.35 A vigorous dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas,
concurred in by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, stated that since the
Benanti case,3 6 Schwartz "stands alone as an abberation from the
otherwise vigorous enforcement this court has given to the congressional policy embodied in 47 U.S.C. § 605. * * * Yet today a

majority of this Court summarily holds that Schwartz v. State of
Texas .

.

. is still the law, and petitioner is left only with the con-

soling knowledge that Congress meant to protect the privacy of his
telephone conversations, while the benefits of the congressional
indictment are denied him. '8 7 As for Stefanelli, Mr. Justice Douglas
says "Here the thrust of the relief is only to enjoin the use of wiretap evidence, not to enjoin the action itself. Hence there is no bar

29 Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947).
30 Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960)
31 The Federal Communications Act, 68 Stat. 30

(1958) provides:

(Clark, J., dissenting).

(1954), 47 U.S.C. § 501

. in this chapter
upon conviction
thereof, be punished . . . by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or both. .. ."
"Any person who .

.

. does .

.

. any act .

prohibited or declared to be unlawful .

.

.
. shall,

In actuality only one successful prosecution, United States v. Gris, 247

F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1957), has been found which was based upon this section.
32 Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).
33 Pugach v. Dollinger, 81 Sup. Ct. 650 (1961).

34 344 U.S. 199 (1952).

Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in the result in
Pugach v. Dollinger, 81 Sup. Ct. 650 (1961), excluded the Schwartz case
as a basis for affirming the lower courts in Pugach.
35 342 U.S. 117 (1951). See also note 34, supra.
36

37

355 U.S. 96 (1957).
Pugach v. Dollinger, 81 Sup. Ct. 650, 650-51 (1961).
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to the action."38 In conclusion, he observes that "The privacy of the
individual, history assures us, can never be protected where its
violation by state officers meets with reward rather than punishment."3 9
Allen L. Graves, '62

LABOR LAWFEDERAL COURT INJUNCTION
AGAINST BREACH OF NO-STRIKE CLAUSE
A union picketed interstate motor carriers to induce non-union
clerical employees to join the union, and caused a shutdown of employers' terminals. The employers sought an injunction to specifically enforce the no-strike clause of the collective bargaining agreement in a federal court under Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act which states: '
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor

organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-

merce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States

having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
incontroversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
Held: Federal courts have jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief
to enforce the no-strike clause in spite of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act

38
39

prohibition 2

against

issuance

of

injunctions

in

a

labor

Pugach v. Dollinger, 81 Sup. Ct. 650, 652 (1961).
Pugach v. Dollinger, 81 Sup. Ct. 650, 653 (1961).

161 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
2 The relevant sections under the Norris-LaGuardia Act are the following:
1. Section 4: "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to

issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any
case involving or growing out of any labor dispute ... " 47 Stat. 70
(1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
2. Section 7: "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction
to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute, except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court (with opportunity for cross examination) in support
of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and except after finding of fact by the
court.... ." 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).

3. Section 13 (c): "The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy
concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,

